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Introduction 
For most analysts (to the extent they consider the subject at all), subversion as a threat 
essentially evaporated with the close of the Cold War. A notable exception is David Kilcullen, a 
leading counterinsurgency strategist, who recently outlined what he terms the "five classes of 
threat that currently confront Europe," namely, terrorist cells, subversive networks, extremist 
political movements, insurgent sympathiser networks, and crime overlapping with terrorism.[1] In 
order to understand the dynamics of this complex and shifting threat, he offers a new definition of 
subversion, as "the conscious, clandestine manipulation of grievances, short of armed conflict, in 
order to weaken states, communities and organisations."[2] In Europe, according to Kilcullen, 
subversion is directed primarily against Muslim communities, and takes the following forms: 
the penetration of Muslim community organisations, mosques and youth groups by 
militants who manipulate people's grievances for the purpose of recruitment to insurgent 
and terrorist activity... subversive manipulation of civil unrest... agitation and recruitment 
in prison populations... infiltration of security services [and the] intimidation of moderates 
and the assassination of political opponents.[3] 
In helping to reintroduce us to the concept of subversion, Kilcullen has laid the groundwork for 
additional research into its contemporary manifestations. This article will address the first-order 
question of change and continuity in subversion since the Cold War. Although the motivations, 
interests, and ideologies that propelled Cold-War era subversion have largely vanished, the 
tactics and techniques of subversion have not. Today the most important subversives are not 
Third World guerrillas, or Communist Party operatives burrowing within Western governments, 
but extremists from the outermost fringes of the Muslim world who operate within local Muslim 
communities. Subversion remains a tool of insurgents everywhere, but it is also an important part 
of the repertoire of other armed groups, clandestine organizations, and religious extremists. 
Understanding the contours of the threat is an obvious first step in crafting countermeasures. 
To provide context for understanding present-day subversion, this article begins with an overview 
of subversion as it was conceptualized and practiced in the West during the twentieth century. 
Because of some interesting parallels with contemporary subversion, this section includes a 
consideration of Irish Republican subversion in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. This is followed by an analysis of present-day subversion by Islamist extremists in the 
United Kingdom, where the problem of subversion directed against Muslim communities is 
particularly acute. The article then offers some preliminary policy considerations for the United 
States. 
Subversion in its Historical Context 
For most of the twentieth century, Western governments saw political subversion as an 
essentially Marxist-Leninist phenomenon and an instrument of international communism. To be 
sure, European colonial powers in the pre-war period frequently characterized labor militancy, 
nationalist agitation, student unrest—in fact, nearly any indigenous opposition to colonial or 
imperial authority—as subversive. However, colonial administrators and metropolitan politicians 
inevitably traced such instability back to a wellspring in Moscow.[4] At the height of the Cold War, 
the linkage between conflict and disorder in the so-called "underdeveloped areas" of the Third 
World and Soviet (and, later, Chinese) subversive designs was an axiom in Western capitals. 
Beginning in the mid-1950s, combating subversion through internal security assistance to 
threatened regimes became a significant component of the U.S. efforts to thwart Soviet advances 
in the Third World. During the early 1960s, Kennedy Administration counterinsurgency 
enthusiasts integrated countersubversion into a more thoroughgoing political-military strategy for 
pushing back communist revolution by simultaneously fighting guerrillas, building "host-nation" 
capacity, and delegitimizing anti-regime elements. Although acknowledging the theoretical 
possibility of non-communist subversion, as a practical matter Cold-War counterinsurgents 
regarded subversion as a set of communist techniques that included creation of front groups, the 
manipulation of strikes, and the infiltration and control of mass organizations.[5] 
However, for U.S. and allied decisionmakers, the developing world was hardly the only target for 
communist subversion. The West itself, and in particular, its state institutions, was deemed to be 
at risk. As J. Edgar Hoover, the director of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and 
arguably the country's most prominent anti-communist, declared in 1957, the United States 
confronted a "monster of subversion" in the form of international communism.[6] While it is 
tempting to dismiss such fulminations, recent scholarship confirms the depths of Moscow's 
seventy-year commitment to penetrating and manipulating Western institutions.[7] Countering 
subversion remained an important FBI priority until the mid-1970s, when press and 
Congressional investigations into Watergate and related scandals effectively shut down the 
bureau's domestic intelligence operations. 
On the other side of the Atlantic, however, countersubversion remained a priority for Britain's 
internal security structures until the end of the Cold War. During the mid- to late 1970s, a number 
of apparent threats to parliamentary democracy—most notably, violent trade-union militancy, 
orchestrated in some cases by communist and Trotskyist groups—led the Security Service 
("MI5") and police Special Branches to devote considerable resources to investigating the threat 
from subversion.[8] In Britain, as in the United States, "subversion" was never defined in law, but 
as employed by MI5, the term connoted the manipulation of individuals and groups by 
undemocratic forces. Subversives, according to the Security Service, "sought to infiltrate and 
manipulate bona fide organisations, such as trade unions or pressure groups, as a way of 
exercising influence out of proportion to any support they could achieve through the ballot box."[9] 
Irish Republican Subversion 
A different facet of subversion, as an integral part of a campaign of terrorism, emerged in 
Northern Ireland from 1969 onwards as the early, Marxist-Leninist leaning Irish Republican Army 
(IRA), under Chief of Staff Sean MacStiofain, moved to capitalize on the sectarian violence that 
had erupted in opposition to the burgeoning Civil Rights movement in Northern Ireland.[10] The 
IRA did not create the conditions that led to sectarian rioting and mob violence. They were initially 
few in number and had virtually no weapons.[11] However, they were quick to capitalize on the 
situation by quickly building and controlling a support base among republican communities that 
had suffered the most and were still felt under threat. Their activities were essentially subversive 
in nature and designed to replace normal government control of the population with their own. 
The methods they used ranged from using coercion in those communities to enforce both the 
authority of the IRA and their self-proclaimed 'right' to act as judge, jury and not infrequently 
executioner of those who they suspected of acting as police or Army informers or who showed 
any tendency to be sympathetic towards them or hostility to the IRA or its methods. They 
organized "rent strikes" and other forms of civil disobedience up to and including violent street 
protests and disorder, ran propaganda campaigns (particularly in relation to imprisoned IRA 
"volunteers") and systematically assassinated Royal Ulster Constabulary police officers and 
members of the local Ulster Defence Regiment (irrespective of whether any of them were on or 
off duty) . Viewed in this context, every act of terrorism they carried out, irrespective of whether 
the victims were police, military or civilians, became an act of political propaganda designed to 
portray the IRA to a local, national and international audience as a force to be reckoned with. 
So-called "no-go" areas were established, particularly in the Bogside and Creggan housing 
estates of Londonderry, then renamed "Free Derry" by republicans. In the absence of any official 
presence, the IRA controlled "their" areas by a system of street committees. They established 
their own "courts" and used them to impose punishments ranging from "street cleaning, tarring 
and feathering, shooting in the arms and legs and death."[12] It took nearly thirty thousand troops 
and police under "Operation Motorman" in July 1972 to clear the barricades sealing off "Free 
Derry" and to reintroduce the rule of law, albeit on a very tenuous basis for many years to 
come.[13] 
Contemporary Subversion in the United Kingdom 
The current situation in the UK is not best described either by using Kilcullen's five-threat model 
(although it encompasses them all) nor by excluding "armed conflict" from the concept of 
subversion as it operates today (it forms an integral part of the overall dynamic). All these 
elements are found today under one particular threat faced by the UK, namely Al Qaeda 
generated and inspired violent jihadism and terrorism. It is complex, multi-dimensional and poses 
many new challenges. It manifests itself in two main ways; as radicalism, extremism and 
terrorism within the UK and in insurgency and violent jihadism in countries other than the UK.[14] 
These activities are underpinned by individuals and networks involved in two crucial aspects of 
generating these: First there is logistical and financial support and facilitation; second, there is the 
encouragement, channelling and assistance of young Muslim men to participate in violent jihad 
overseas. It is from this pool in particular that almost all of the key individuals involved in planning 
and preparing terrorist attacks in the UK to date have been drawn, a fact that prompted the UK 
Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, when on a recent visit to Pakistan, to state: "Three quarters of the 
most serious plots investigated by the British authorities have links to Al Qaeda in Pakistan."[15] 
Subversion in its generally understood British sense of seeking to undermine parliamentary 
democracy can also be found enfolded in the current threat.[16] Two main groups, Hizb ut-Tahrir 
("Liberation Party," or HT) and Al Muhajjiroun ("The Emigrants"), as well as so-called "radical 
preachers" such as Omar Bakri Mohammed and others, call directly for the replacement of the 
democratic system with a single Caliphate based on Sharia law. HT does not advocate violence 
as a means to achieve this objective and hence it would be easy to dismiss its members as mere 
idealists. However, evidence from insiders who have left the organisation paint a picture of their 
aims and methods—including the use of front groups—that would be instantly recognisable to the 
"practiced subversives"[17] of the twentieth century.[18] In addition to this specific subversive 
aspect of the wider threat, of more importance to the UK is the overall subversive impact 
generated by a combination of all the elements of the threat. However, the subversive impact on 
the state itself is minimal. Where it is felt most keenly is within the many Muslim communities that 
are the most affected by it and in turn, the reverberations of this are inevitably felt throughout 
wider society. 
The UK government has put in place a wide variety of measures to prevent and mitigate the 
threat. The national counterterrorism strategy, known as CONTEST, has a strand based on the 
concept of "Prevent" which acts as the focal point for the many activities that are underway to 
strengthen and support initiatives at the local level.[19] To better deliver CONTEST, in May 2007 
the Home Office itself was restructured, along with other complementary changes to the 
machinery of government. Its wider criminal justice system functions were transferred to a new 
Ministry of Justice and to better deliver the community-based requirements, the Department for 
Local Government and Communities became involved for the first time in tackling extremism and 
terrorism.[20] The Home Office retains overall responsibility for counter terrorism and policing. 
Countersubversion: Policy Options for the United States 
By any measure, American Muslims are overwhelmingly law abiding, socially integrated, and 
prosperous—far more so than Muslims in a number of Western European countries.[21] 
Nevertheless, U.S. authorities have uncovered a number of terrorist plots. None of these ever 
came close to carrying out a terrorist attack, although the prison-based Jama'at al-Islam As-
Sahee cell in Southern California neared the operational stage, according to Los Angeles police 
officials[22] Moreover, transnational extremist organizations like HT are active in the United 
States,[23] and Muslim communities are likely targets for subversion, albeit to a much smaller 
degree than they are across the Atlantic. Although the FBI has made a substantial effort to 
develop relationships within Muslim communities, and to encourage Muslims to remain vigilant 
against potential extremists in their midst, countersubversion remains a badly neglected subject 
whose significance is not fully recognised, both inside and outside of government. Indeed, since 
September 11, 2001, the entire subject of domestic terrorism ("homegrown" or inspired from 
outside) has languished in an analytical ghetto.[24] More research is required to identify the 
contours and dimensions of terrorist threats emanating from within the United States. In the 
meantime, the following is a first attempt to outline an approach to countersubversion that is 
appropriate for, and sensitive to, the U.S. context. 
American legal traditions, cultural norms, and a deeply-ingrained minimalist philosophy regarding 
the size and capacity of the state make a heavy-handed approach both undesirable and politically 
unacceptable. To be sure, Americans in the years immediately following the September 11, 2001 
attacks supported vigorous government action to combat terrorism at home and abroad. But the 
backlash in response to domestic eavesdropping and the creation of a "surveillance state" arrived 
relatively quickly, and stretched across the U.S. political spectrum. Another attack on the scale of 
9/11 could generate political support for stronger measures against perceived "enemies within." 
But in the absence of such an attack, any "maximalist" approach to countering subversion is likely 
to face stiff opposition—and not just among Muslim-Americans. 
As Kilcullen suggests, Muslims should not be seen as sources of insecurity, but rather as targets 
for extremists.[25] Two approaches to countersubversion should therefore receive particular 
emphasis. First, local police, who ideally will have close relationships within threatened 
communities, should play a major role in protecting individuals and groups from intimidation and 
other strong-arm tactics by subversives. As with policing more generally, public trust is essential, 
and so the police must make major commitments to understanding and supporting the Muslim 
communities in which they operate. 
Second, public information campaigns should have a prominent place in any effort to identify and 
thwart subversion. The protections offered by the free speech clause of the First Amendment are 
not absolute, and some forms of subversion—for example, "calls to commit illegal acts 
imminently," that is, incitement—are clearly against the law.[26] But many forms of subversion, 
such as the use of front groups, are not illegal, and cannot be prosecuted. However, this does not 
mean that such activities are harmless. In Western Europe, the activities of groups like HT have 
had highly disruptive effects on religious and political expression. Exposing front groups, 
extremist recruitment activities, and indoctrination at colleges and universities—in other words, 
showing subversion for what it is—can help strip away the clandestinity that is essential for 
subversion to succeed. Although the state might be tempted to assist in such a "sunshine" policy, 
it would almost certainly be more credible and effective if the threatened communities themselves 
exposed subversion in their midst. Among other things, it would avoid the perception that the 
state is interfering in any way with Islam itself and seeking to impose a preferred version of the 
faith. 
Conclusion 
As this article has argued, present-day subversion shares key features with its earlier 
manifestations. The targets and overall objectives of today's subversives are different, to be sure, 
but some of the methods remain timeless. Moreover, as was the case during the Cold War, 
subversion needs to be conceptualized as one facet of a broader campaign that employs in a 
non-linear fashion a range of violent, less-violent, and non-violent instruments that serve to 
reinforce each other. 
However, it is crucial to understand the differences between contemporary subversion, which is 
directed against Muslim communities, and subversion during the Cold War, which was directed 
primarily (but not exclusively) at state institutions. The infiltration of the armed forces, police, and 
government agencies is probably a small component of subversion today. The main thrust of 
countersubversion, both in Britain and the United States, should therefore be on the protection of 
Muslim communities from those who are undermining them from within, and on building and 
strengthening linkages between those communities and the larger society. 
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